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<b>Terrorism</b>	Review
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	Terrorism Review	25 <b>X</b> ′
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Focus	Terry Waite, Hostage Negotiator	25 <b>X</b> ′
	Terry Waite, a British aide to the Archbishop of Canterbury since 1980, has assisted in the release of hostages in three separate incidents over the past five years. Waite succeeded in freeing British hostages held in Iran and Libya in 1981 and 1985, respectively, and, according to the Weir family, played a role in the release of American hostage Benjamin Weir last September. His previous efforts have earned him accolades from all involved for his patience, humor, and discretion.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	An Accomplished Adviser	
	Waite has earned his position as a trustworthy intermediary. His extreme caution and discretion have made him a valuable person in the highly charged business of hostage negotiating. Although Waite does not appear to have sought such a role, he has extensive experience in church diplomacy and in the Third World.	25 <b>X</b> ′
	Educated at the Church Army College—an independent adjunct to the Anglican Church primarily concerned with mission work—and elsewhere, Waite's international experience extends back to 1968. He spent four years in Africa as the adviser on missionary activities to the first Anglican Bishop of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. He also organized the Sudan Relief Project. In 1972 he began a seven-year stint as a consultant to the Roman Catholic Church on missionary development and still maintains contact with the Vatican. He says he has held consultations with the Pope on his efforts in the Lebanon hostage situation.	25 <b>X</b>
	<ul> <li>Previous Efforts</li> <li>After he was appointed an aide to Archbishop Runcie for his missionary and ecumenical work, Waite entered the minefield of hostage negotiations apparently by chance:</li> <li>The Anglican Church became involved in efforts to obtain the release of British citizens held in Iran in 1980 because three of the hostages were Anglican</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>when Libya seized four British nationals in 1984, the wife of one hostage turned to the Archbishop for help because her husband had been the organist at the Anglican Church in Tripoli.</li> <li>His publicized success in these endeavors probably led American Presbyterian Church leaders to ask for Waite's help in the case of the Reverend Weir, a missionary held hostage in Lebanon since May 1984. The nature of Waite's role has been kept secret by all parties.</li> </ul>	25X1
	In the case of the hostages in Iran and Libya, Waite acted as an impartial mediator who made no claims to represent any government or institution other than the Anglican Church. He argued that no purpose would be served by continued detention of innocent persons and may have persuaded Iran and Libya	

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that releasing the hostages would improve their international images. Waite met with senior Iranian clerics and government officials during three trips to Tehran. The three Anglicans were released in February 1981; a businessman held on criminal charges in addition to allegations of espionage was not released. After he made several trips to Libya, Waite met with Qadhafi on Christmas day 1984. Qadhafi freed the four British businessmen last February. In both cases, the freed hostages were released into Waite's custody, and he accompanied them back to 25X1 Britain. Although Waite's personal qualities—his widely cited patience, compassion, humor, and the ability to listen—have been instrumental, his successes may also have been fortuitous. The very fact that his position has been unofficial has been used to embarrass governments by pointing up the failure of diplomacy. When the Thatcher government appeared to take credit for the release of the British nationals in Libya in February 1985, the Archbishop's office released a sharp statement refuting the government's claim. In 1981 the Iranians may already have decided to let the missionaries go: their release came just two weeks after the American Embassy hostages were freed. 25X1 Waite stresses his unofficial role and his interest in hostage crises from the viewpoint of a man of faith. This honest and disarming approach has gained him access to leaders like Qadhafi and Iranian clerics when British diplomats could not. It has helped him in Beirut, where he has already been in touch with the Hizballah faction holding the US hostages. 25X1 Mission to Beirut Waite flew to Beirut on 13 November apparently at the invitation of the terrorists who have held six Americans hostage, some since March 1984. The kidnapers had released letters the previous weekend from four of the hostages addressed to President Reagan, two Congressmen, and their own families. Also included in the package was a confidential letter to Waite, evidently inviting him to Beirut. 25X1 The lack of information about Waite's role in the release of Reverend Weir makes it difficult to assess his chances of success in this current mission. Waite has avoided self-aggrandizing publicity: reports of his involvement came initially from the Weir family and the Presbyterian Church. Only after this announcement did Waite acknowledge his role in a typically low-key fashion. He indicated that he had been in contact with an unidentified Lebanese intermediary for at least six months prior to Weir's release, but refused to disclose further details. 25X1 There are several possible explanations for Waite's current involvement with the American hostages in Lebanon. The terrorists are under increasing pressure from the Syrians and may be willing to release the remaining hostages as a face-saving end to the situation. They may believe that, by releasing the Americans to Waite, they would prevent the US Government from implying that it was responsible for their release. The kidnapers also may believe that turning them over to an unofficial foreigner without specific power or authority would embarrass the US Government. Alternatively, the Lebanese extremists may still believe their demands will be met, and that involving Waite will grant their demands a more

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espective hearing. They may be using time simply to reflerate their message to the	
world as they attempted to do in releasing Weir. Obtaining the release of the	
American hostages may prove beyond his reach, since Hizballah has not wavered	
n its call for the release of the Dawa Party prisoners in Kuwait, and the Kuwaitis	
vill probably be reluctant to meet with Waite.	25 <b>X</b> 1
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# **Highlights**

# **Key Indicators** Honduras Possible Threat to US Military Personnel US personnel participating in joint US-Honduran military exercises will continue to provide attractive targets for potential terrorist attacks. 25X1 leftist guerrillas have received training in Nicaragua in the use of sophisticated explosive devices and are surveilling US and Honduran intelligence assets as well as US aircraft, billets, and other restricted areas of Palmerola Airbase. 25X1 Groups most likely to attack US targets include the Popular Revolutionary Forces-Lorenzo Zelaya (FPR/LZ) group, the People's Revolutionary Union/Popular Liberation Movement-Cinchoneros (URP/MPL), and the Marxist-dominated United Federation of Honduran Workers. The first two are among the most violence-prone and active insurgent groups in Honduras. The FPR/LZ is referred to as "the vanguard group" in leftist circles and prides itself in undertaking highrisk operations. 25X1 Malta, Egypt Sixty Die in Storming of Hijacked Airliner On 23 November, three to five unidentified gunmen took over an Egyptair passenger jet bound from Athens to Cairo. They diverted the aircraft to Malta after damage from a midair shootout prevented it from landing in Tripoli or Tunis, the hijackers' preferred destinations. During the takeover, a gun battle reportedly took place, in which a hijacker and an Egyptian security guard were killed. Once on the ground in Malta, the gunmen demanded fuel to fly on to Sigonella Airbase in Italy but were refused. By the evening of the 24th, the hijackers were believed to have executed six or seven hostages, among them one American woman. 25X1 That evening, nearly 24 hours after the hijacking began, Egyptian commandos from the "777" counterterrorist unit stormed the plane in an attempt to rescue the

from the "777" counterterrorist unit stormed the plane in an attempt to rescue the hostages. The terrorists threw grenades during the assault, which Egypt alleges accounted for the nearly 60 persons killed in the resulting fire. Some of the 30 surviving passengers and crew claimed the commandos fired indiscriminately, but Egyptian officials claim that their force fired only seven shots. One hijacker also survived.

The gunmen had identified themselves only as "Egyptian revolutionaries," and it is not yet known whether they had any connection to a group called the "Egyptian Revolution," which claimed two shootings of Israeli diplomats in Cairo in 1984 and 1985. On 25 November a communique claiming credit for the attack was issued in the name of the "Arab Revolutionary Brigades," a covername used by the anti-Arafat Palestinian Abu Nidal Group. Either group could have conducted the operation independently or could have received help from Libya. That country

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Secret is the prime suspect in Egyptian eyes, but we currently lack sufficient evidence to lay this act at Qadhafi's door, although he has demonstrated both means and motivation. 25X1 Car Bomb Wounds 32 in Frankfurt-am-Main West Germany A car bomb exploded in a parking lot adjacent to a US military exchange in Frankfurt-am-Main on 24 November. The vehicle, which had been parked outside the secure zone maintained by the military police, contained an estimated 90 kilograms of explosives. There were no fatalities, but 32 persons were injured, mostly US military personnel and dependents. 25X1 Some West German officials believe that the bombing may have been carried out by Middle Eastern terrorists. The car had been purchased the previous day by a foreigner who spoke through a foreign interpreter and used a Moroccan passportcommonly used by a number of Palestinian and other terrorist groups. This Moroccan passport had a serial number close to those on forged passports of two Palestinian terrorists arrested in Madrid last summer in an apparent plot against the Syrian Ambassador to Spain. Other West German officials believe the bombing may have been the work of indigenous leftist groups such as the Red Army Faction (RAF). Even prior to this attack, those officials had noted an increase in the RAF's activities over the past two months, including more travel by suspected terrorists and more vigorous activity by imprisoned RAF members. As a result, they came to believe that an RAF attack was imminent. It is also possible 25X1 that a West German rightwing group conducted the attack. The use of a Middle Easterner and the choice of target would seem to be significant departures for the RAF, but the group recently has evidenced other unusual operational behavior. In the August car bombing at Rhein-Main Air Force Base, for example—claimed by the RAF in a joint communique with the French group Action Directe—the RAF killed a US serviceman in order to obtain his identification card. The RAF had not previously killed noncombatants apart from its actual attacks. The target—a shopping area known to be frequented primarily by US military dependents—is atypical for the RAF, but the tightened security around obvious terrorist targets such as diplomatic and military installations may have influenced the group to attack a "softer" target. 25X1 Significant Developments **New Leftist Group Emerging?** Armenians In a communique to Armenian newspapers, a previously unknown group calling itself the Armenian Revolutionary Federation-Revolutionary Movement (ARF-

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RM) has threatened to execute "all traitors" in the service of the United States, Israel, or Turkey. The communique called on members to quit the rightist Dashnag Party, which it called "a ploy of American imperialists."

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	This new group has claimed credit for abducting and killing two Dashnag Party members last spring in Lebanon. An ARF-RM spokesman has also promised to publish details of a plot by the Dashnag leadership—called the Bureau—against the Armenian people. The plot is allegedly based on the confessions of Sarkis Zeitlian, a leading member of the Bureau who was kidnaped last March in Beirut. The leftwing Armenian press is now speculating that the ARF-RM may have been responsible for the Zeitlian kidnaping.	25X1
	The tone of the communique resembles those issued by the leftwing Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and its affiliated groups. In addition, the ARF-RM's name resembles that of ASALA's Revolutionary Movement, known as ASALA-RM, which surfaced with a July 1983 bombing of Paris's Orly Airport. It is possible that the ARF-RM consists of radical leftists who want to undermine the Dashnag Party and discredit its leaders and moderate policies. In any event, several ASALA splinter groups have emerged since the Orly bombing, but none has obtained enough support to mount major terrorist attacks.	2574
		25 <b>X</b> 1
Canada, India	Sikh Paramilitary Training According to the Canadian press, Sikh separatists from the United States and Canada are undergoing training at the Eagle Combat and Bodyguard School near Vancouver, British Columbia. A Sikh spokesman has asserted that the training is necessary for security personnel in Sikh temples to keep order. The school allegedly is operated by a veteran of bush wars in Africa and provides security and unconventional warfare training similar to that taught by a school in Alabama that has also trained Sikhs.	25X1
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## Spain

#### **GRAPO Attempts To Rebuild**

The outlawed Spanish Communist Party (Reconstituted) (PCE-R), which advocates the overthrow of the Spanish Government and the removal of all US military installations, is attempting to rebuild its military wing, the First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO). Manuel Perez Martinez, alias "Arenas," the Secretary General of the PCE-R and a leading member of GRAPO, reportedly has been recruiting members and leaders for new GRAPO commando units. He and several other senior GRAPO members escaped massive arrests last January that decimated the group.

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GRAPO's previous rebuilding efforts were aided by recruits from the Association of Families and Friends of Political Prisoners, a PCE-R front organization. Although GRAPO's recent reverses and membership losses have severely hampered its operational capabilities, the group retains the ability to recruit new members and probably will return to its previous level of activity.

Italy

#### More Terrorists May Be Released

In late October a Milan court released 10 members of the Prima Linea terrorist group who were appealing their convictions for terrorist activities. They were released at least in part because their appeals could not be completed by 30 November, when the controversial 1984 preventive detention reform law is scheduled to go fully into effect. This law requires that detainees be released within six years if their trials and appeals have not been completed and further stipulates that they may not be jailed for more than two years at any stage of the process. As many as 200 potentially dangerous detainees—including an undetermined number of terrorist suspects—may soon be released, according to the US Embassy.

The Italian courts have completed the trials and appeals of some 1,300 criminals since the original deadline was delayed in February. The Milan court decision may indicate, however, that the government, unless it requests a second postponement, probably will be unable to try the remaining 200 cases—resulting in the release of those detainees.

Lebanon

## **Bomb Disrupts Meeting of Christian Leaders**

On 12 November a truck bomb exploded at a former monastery in East Beirut where high-level Christians had gathered to discuss opposition to a Syrian-backed plan for political reform. The truckdriver and three other persons were killed, and another 36 persons were injured, including former President Camille Chamoun. The bomb caused extensive damage to the monastery and broke windows at the US Embassy Annex, 300 meters away.

Responsibility for the bombing was claimed in the names of two previously unknown Christian groups, but one of three Syrian-sponsored groups—the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, the Lebanese Ba'th Party, or Eli Hubayka's Lebanese Forces—are the most likely perpetrators. Syria would like to eliminate or intimidate Christian opposition to its reform plan.

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Libya-Cuba-Chile	Aid to MIR Terrorist Group Tripoli reportedly has promised \$1 million to the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) to finance expanded terrorist operations, while Cuba is also urging the group to increase its armed attacks. Havana and Tripoli are not known to be coordinating their assistance to the group, however, and they are bitter competitors for influence elsewhere in the Third World.	25X1
	Libya, which formerly provided only modest support to several far-left groups in Chile, primarily training, evidently is now prepared to commit substantial aid to the MIR—it has given \$100,000 so far. The MIR has yet to demonstrate a capacity to stage larger, more frequent operations, however, and Tripoli almost certainly will make future payments contingent on more aggressive terrorist attacks.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	The MIR is reportedly using the funds to rebuild its military cadre and create arms-smuggling networks through Argentina and Bolivia. Group leaders are worried that efforts to smuggle arms through Bolivia may have been compromised after security forces there raided a safehouse in La Paz on 10 October. The group, formerly the most active terrorist organization in the country, has been rebuilding its armed wing for the past few months and now has an estimated 400 to 500	
	members.	25 <b>X</b> 1
		25 <b>X</b> 1
		25X1
		_0/(.
Somalia	Move Toward Terrorist Tactics?	
	the Central Committee of the insurgent Somali National Movement (SNM) recently approved plans to employ terrorism and hit-and-run guerrilla attacks in Somali towns. The insurgents—mainly Issak tribesmen who seek autonomy for northern Somalia—have been weakened by leadership disputes and defections, and probably believe that such tactics will help them regain the initiative in their struggle against the Siad regime. The government also has undercut the SNM's strength with a successful amnesty	25X1
	program and conciliatory gestures toward its disgruntled tribal supporters.	25 <b>X</b> 1 25 <b>X</b> 1
	Although the SNM usually concentrates its attacks along the northern Ogaden border, the insurgents have in the past demonstrated an ability to carry out effective guerrilla and sabotage operations deeper in northern Somalia. Because of the SNM's pro-Western stance, however, we doubt it would target US personnel at the northern port of Berbera. Terrorist operations—particularly in towns—are likely to boomerang, as civilian casualties would probably alienate tribal support	
	and handicap the insurgents' intelligence gathering and fundraising.	25X1

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Lebanon: Release of		
the Soviet Hostages		25X1
		20/(1
The Soviets were able to secure the release of their	the Soviets to show good will and persuade "others" to	
three surviving hostages in Lebanon on 30 October—		
	stop harassment of Sunni fundamentalists in Tripoli.	051/4
one month after their capture—because virtually all		25 <b>X</b> 1
the major actors in Lebanon sought to obtain the		
hostages' release and had nothing to gain by their	The Soviet Response	
continued detention. Resolution of the Soviet hostage	The Soviet hostages were freed in Lebanon because	
situation also suggests that cooperation among Syria,	Moscow had important allies positioned to exert	
Iran, and the various Lebanese militias probably is	pressure on the kidnapers. The lack of retaliation so	
essential for securing the release of the US hostages.	far also suggests that Moscow may have struck a deal	
The incident underscores the support Moscow enjoys	to secure the hostages' safe release.	25X1
in certain Middle Eastern quarters and demonstrates		20/1
the Soviets' unwillingness to use force when it	Diplomatic. The Soviets appear to have relied almost	
probably would have been counterproductive.	exclusively on diplomatic efforts. They responded	25X1
productly would have been counterproductive.	quickly to the kidnaping by asking every country and	23/1
The Kidnapers and Their Demands	- · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
_	organization in the region that had some influence in	
Four Soviet officials were kidnaped in Beirut on 30	Lebanon to render assistance. In Lebanon, Soviet	
September during a period of heavy fighting in	Charge Suslikov held almost daily meetings with	05)/4
Tripoli, Lebanon, between pro-Syrian Lebanese	Druze and Amal officials;	25 <b>X</b> 1
militias and Sunni fundamentalists of the Islamic		25 <b>X</b> 1
Unification Movement (IUM). An anonymous caller		
claimed responsibility for the kidnaping on behalf of		
the Islamic Liberation Organization, and threatened	Moscow also remained	25X1
that the four Soviets would be executed unless Syrian-	in close communication with the Syrians through its	
backed militias ceased their offensive against the	Embassy in Damascus.	25X1
Sunni fundamentalists. We believe the kidnapers	<del></del>	20711
probably were Sunni fundamentalists sympathetic to	Rhetorical. Publicly, the Soviet reaction to the	
the IUM. On 2 October one Soviet hostage—consular	kidnaping was cautious and low key throughout.	
officer Katkov—was shot and his body dumped in	Moscow carefully avoided making threats and	
West Beirut.	reaffirmed the Soviet commitment to an independent	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Lebanon. The Soviet press service Novosti even stated	20/(1
A cease-fire went into effect in Tripoli on 4 October,		
but the kidnapers continued to hold the remaining	on 19 October that the kidnapers should fulfill their	
<del>-</del>	promise and release the hostages because the fighting	051/4
hostages. Callers claiming to represent the kidnapers	in Tripoli had calmed.	25 <b>X</b> 1
said they would not be freed until the USSR and the	No. of the second secon	
United States ended Lebanon's 10-year-old civil war.	Military. The Soviets may have considered the use of	
A statement published in a Lebanese newspaper later	force, but we discerned no activity that might indicate	
added the liberation of Afghanistan to the kidnapers'	preparations for either a rescue operation or a	
demands. Anonymous callers also demanded that	retaliatory strike. The logistic difficulties involved in a	
Moscow close its Embassy in Lebanon.	Soviet counterterrorism operation abroad probably	25 <b>X</b> 1
	diminished the viability of such an option. Moreover,	
The kidnapers released the remaining three Soviet	they may well have decided that the political costs of	
hostages unharmed on 30 October in a Sunni	a military response were unacceptable. In mid-	
neighborhood of West Beirut after Lebanese militias	October, a Soviet expert on the Middle East stated	
conducted extensive house-to-house searches. In a	•	
communique, the kidnapers said that they released		

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Arkadiv Katakov

Valeriy Mirikov

that Moscow had ruled out military action, claiming that US experience had demonstrated the futility of the military option in a hostage crisis. Moscow further decided not to "show the flag" by stationing naval forces off the Lebanese coast or sending military forces to Syria.

The lack of retaliation against the kidnapers suggests that Moscow may have struck a deal to secure the hostages' safe release. A promise not to retaliate in exchange for the hostages' freedom would give the incident a low profile, an attractive option to Moscow in that it would not antagonize Lebanese extremists or remind the world that Soviet citizens are as vulnerable in Lebanon as Westerners. Historically, the Soviets have demonstrated a willingness to negotiate and make political concessions when dealing with a situation in which geographical constraints

make action impossible.

## Moscow's Allies

	al role in securing the release of
the Soviet hostages.	
	Syria also probably
secured Iranian assis	stance, and, along with Moscow,
applied pressure on t	the Druze, Amal, and other
	the hostages. In Tripoli, Syria

imposed a settlement on the Sunni fundamentalists in which Syrian forces occupied large parts of the city.

Lebanese Militias. In Lebanon, the Druze, Amalboth of which have important military relationships with the USSR—and virtually all of the leftist militias worked hard to identify the kidnapers and secure the release of the hostages.

Such pressure no doubt contributed to locating the kidnapers and prompting them to end the crisis. Although Moscow has avoided giving special praise to any one group or country for resolving the incident, the Druze probably expect to curry favor with the Soviets for their assistance,

# Implications for the US Hostages

The outcome of the Soviet hostage situation indicates that a concerted effort among the major actors in Lebanon probably is essential for securing the release of the US hostages. The similarity ends there, however. The US hostages are held by Hizballah, a fanatic Shia fundamentalist group that is much better

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organized and disciplined than the Sunni fundamentalists who kidnaped the Soviets. Because of its strength and experience, Hizballah is much less likely to succumb to external pressures. It has not wavered in its demand for the release of 17 Dawa prisoners in Kuwait.

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# **Chronology of Events**

30 September	Four Soviet diplomats kidnaped in West Beirut.
1 October	Anonymous caller claims credit on behalf of Islamic Liberation Organization and threatens to execute the hostages unless Syrian-backed militias cease their offensive of Sunni fundamentalists in Tripoli. Photos are published showing guns held to the hostages' heads.
2 October	Soviet consular officer Katkov's body found in West Beirut suburb.
	Soviets appeal to Syria and to Lebanese groups for help in freeing the hostages.
	Anonymous caller claiming to speak for the kidnapers threatens to blow up the Soviet Embassy within 48 hours.
3 October	Druze and leftist militias move to protect Soviet Embassy.
4 October	Nearly half of the Soviet community evacuated from Lebanon to Syria.
	Syrian-backed offensive in Tripoli ceases with Syrian-imposed truce.
6 October	Cease-fire formally takes effect when 1,000 Syrian troops enter Tripoli.
	Anonymous caller claiming to represent the kidnapers states the hostages will not be freed until the USSR and the United States end Lebanon's 10-year-old civil war.
10 October	Kidnapers claim in newspaper statement that they will keep the hostages until Afghanistan is liberated and the Lebanon crisis is over.
14 October	An anonymous caller warns that, unless the Soviet Embassy is closed, the hostages will be killed and the compound blown up.
24 October	Amal and Druze militias conduct house-to-house searches in West Beirut, rounding up 70 people for interrogations.

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26 October	Soviet Ambassador to Lebanon returns to Beirut.	
28 October	Chief of Syrian military intelligence for Lebanon arrives in Beirut.	
30 October	Remaining three Soviet hostages released in Sunni neighborhood of West Beirut.	
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Palestinians: An Update on

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Abu Nidal Terrorism		25X1
The terrorist capabilities of the radical Palestinian Abu Nidal Group remain strong, in our opinion, whether its leader Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal) is dead or alive. The Abu Nidal Group, which has long	Banna was reported in an October edition of the West German magazine <i>Der Spiegel</i> ; no date or place for the interview was cited.	25 <b>X</b> 1
rejected any political solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute, in the past 12 months has intensified attacks on pro-Arafat Palestinians and those moderate Arab countries that support them, particularly Jordan. The group has threatened further attacks on West European and US interests for their involvement with	Even if the interviews were genuine, we doubt reports that Al-Banna is in "excellent" health. He has long suffered from a serious heart condition and reportedly suffered a major heart attack in 1978 and perhaps a stroke in 1984. We believe that most of the group's operations have been planned and directed in recent	
the peace process.  Senior members of the Abu Nidal Group apparently	years by his two top deputies, Mustafa Murad and Abd al-Rahman Issa. The current capabilities of the	25 <b>X</b> 1
have recently tightened an already tightly	group to carry out terrorist operations do not depend on Al-Banna's status.	25 <b>X</b> 1
compartmented structure and, during the process,	T	
may have transferred more of its elements from Syria to Lebanon. Along with strengthening the group's capabilities, we believe these changes also reflect an underlying concern among Abu Nidal leaders about the reliability of Syria, their host since October 1983. The group strives to maintain its independence, but we believe it has conducted some terrorist operations at the behest of Damascus.  Al-Banna: Elusive or Illusive?  Sabri al-Banna, the group's founder, was rumored to have died and been buried in Iraq in mid-1984, but, over the last few months, some reports—including alleged interviews—have claimed that he is alive and well in Libya. The aura of Al-Banna's leadership is still important. His followers are trying to recoup the losses in membership that followed rumors of his	Target: The Peace Process  The Abu Nidal Group's major goal is to derail, through terrorist tactics, efforts for a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Since Abu Nidal rejected the shift in PLO policy in 1974 toward a diplomatic solution, moderate PLO figures have been the primary targets of the group; PLO Chairman Arafat almost certainly is the group's major target. Following the Palestine National Council meeting in Amman and the signing by King Hussein and Arafat of a peace initiative last February, senior Jordanian officials have been added to the Abu Nidal hit list. The group claimed credit for the assassinations of moderate PLO Executive Committee member Fahd Qawasmah in Jordan in December 1984 and a Jordanian diplomat in Romania that same month. The group also is believed to be responsible for the	25X1
Three alleged interviews with Al-Banna have	murder of another Jordanian diplomat in Turkey last July. (See chronology at end of article.)	25X1 25X1
appeared so far in 1985. No photographs, however,	The group recently threatened to assassinate two	
have accompanied any of these interviews, and explanations and details are either lacking or weak.	other Executive Committee moderates, Muhammad Milhim and Ilya Khuri, both of whom are prominent	
The first interview appeared last February when a	supporters of the peace process and possible	
French journalist claimed to have talked with him in	participants in any future talks among the PLO,	
Tripoli, Libya. The journalist later admitted, however, that he could not be certain that the man to	Jordan, and the United States.	25X1
whom he spoke was Al-Banna. A Kuwaiti journalist		25 <b>X</b> 1
also claimed to have interviewed him in Tripoli in		

September. The most recent alleged dialogue with Al-

		OEV.
	Modus Operandi and Capabilities The Abu Nidal Group appears to be the best	25 <b>X</b> ′
	organized and most effective of the radical Palestinian terrorist groups. The group appears to	
	screen its recruits carefully and even conducts	
	periodic security checks and spot surveillance of its	
	more experienced members. Its practice of recruiting	
In the alleged interview that appeared in Der Spiegel,	more than one member of the same family helps	
Abu Nidal threatened the United States and the	ensure a pool of steady recruits, maintains the	
United Kingdom, as well as other governments, for	exclusivity of the group, and provides a means to	
their roles in the peace process and their efforts	inhibit disloyalty.	25X <sup>2</sup>
against international terrorism. The United Kingdom		2071
has been the target of several Abu Nidal attacks	Operations appear to be carefully planned. A	
designed to force the release from British jails of	supervisor-operative arrangement reportedly is used	
group members, including Al-Banna's nephew. The	frequently to limit the damage to the overall group	
French Government also has been threatened with	should the operative be caught before he reaches the	
violent reprisals if it does not release two Abu Nidal	target area. The operative receives only enough	
members jailed there since their conviction for the	information to carry out his mission. Once he reaches	
murder of the PLO representative in Paris in 1979.	his destination, he contacts a "supervisor," who	
	furnishes him with weapons and reportedly monitors	25 <b>X</b> ′
Organizational Changes in 1985	the conduct of the actual operation.	25 <b>X</b>
In mid-1985, the Abu Nidal organization	In 1985 Abu Nidal turned increasingly to bombings	
restructured its existing committees and covertly	and grenade attacks against commercial facilities,	
transferred personnel from Syria to Lebanon,	although assassination attempts against selected	
transferred personner from Syria to Decanon,	individuals have continued. Improved security for	25 <b>X</b> <sup>2</sup>
	senior-level PLO and Jordanian officials has made	25/
	accessibility to them more difficult. The increased	0574
In our view,	"popularity" of bombings and grenade attacks may	25 <b>X</b> ′
these recent measures reflect the group's efforts to	stem from the fact that such attacks require less	
strengthen its operational capabilities, tighten	training and experience.	25 <b>X</b> ′
security against outside penetrations and informers	AP 17 . 4.	
within the organization, and assure the group an	Aliases and Fronts	
operational base should Syria withdraw its support	The Abu Nidal Group has used several different names to cover its terrorist operations. It often uses	0514
and expel the group as Iraq did in October 1983.	the name "Arab Revolutionary Brigades" in attacks	25X
	against Persian Gulf targets. Following the November	25 <b>X</b> ′
The most important new committee appears to be the	1984 Palestine National Council meeting in Jordan,	
High Command, which runs an elite unit called the	the group began to use the name "Black September"	
Special Military Operations Committee to plan and	to claim responsibility for attacks against Jordanian	
carry out the group's terrorist operations.	and Palestinian targets. The name may have been a	25X <sup>2</sup>
	reference to the Sabra and Shatila massacres that	25X <sup>2</sup>
	took place in Lebanon in September 1982 or,	20/
	alternatively, use of the name may have been intended	

to mock and discredit the former Fatah Black September terrorist organization, which has been defunct since 1974. We believe the group has also used the name "Revolutionary Organization of	If Libya has increased its support, we believe Qadhafi may seek a role in	25X 25X
Socialist Muslims" in attacks against British targets.	selecting Abu Nidal targets, but he is unlikely to succeed in exerting any real leverage over the group.	25X
Bases of Operations and External Support The Abu Nidal Group's central headquarters is in Damascus and it apparently has carried out much of its training at secret locations in Syria. We believe that Syria has used the Abu Nidal Group, along with other radical Palestinians, to do its bidding. Although we have no specific evidence concerning Syrian tasking of Abu Nidal operations, most of the group's	Prospects Terrorism by the Abu Nidal Group is likely to continue unabated. We believe that the status of the peace process is irrelevant to decisions by the Abu Nidal Group's targeting of PLO and other Arab leaders working toward a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. As long as the peace process	25X <sup>-</sup>
attacks have served Syrian interests.	remains stalemated, Syrian-sponsored terrorism against Jordan and Palestinians may decline. Should	25 <b>X</b>
The Abu Nidal Group also has strong support networks in Europe. Based on reports from several	the peace process regain momentum, Syria would be likely to encourage terrorism by the Abu Nidal Group	25X1
liaison services, the group has operatives in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, both of which may serve as transit points and operational bases.	and other radical Palestinians if it feels its interests are not being considered. Syria probably also will want to maintain its support for the Abu Nidal Group to offset growing Libyan backing of the group.	25X1
W 1 V AI		25X <sup>2</sup>
We believe Athens in particular is a staging area for Abu Nidal, presumably because of lax local security. In addition, the group may have some operatives in Pakistan and India.  In 1985 the Abu Nidal Group continued its recruitment efforts among Fatah dissidents, probably	Abu Nidal's grudge is against Arafat and his supporters within the PLO. Although the Abu Nidal Group may consider attacks against US interests—possibly even against US officials involved in the peace initiative—the group has only attacked US targets twice in its history. Syria would be likely to discourage such attacks for the time being, seeing the risks as outweighing the benefits. Despite its	25X
at Syrian urging.	published rhetoric, Libya, too, may hesitate to assume the risk of US retaliation. It may, however, support such operations if it were confident any such attacks	25X 25X
	should not be traced back to Tripoli.	25 <b>X</b> °
Libyan hospitality toward the Abu Nidal organization appears to have grown this year, another indication that the group may be looking for alternatives to Syrian backing. The Abu Nidal Group's track record of successful terrorist operations probably also is appealing to Qadhafi, given the recent failures of many Libyan operations.	Egypt has claimed that the Egyptair hijacking to Malta was carried out by Abu Nidal with Libyan backing. During the course of that incident, passengers of Western origin were singled out for execution. While we cannot confirm the Egyptian claims of collusion, we believe they may be intended to support Mubarak's public allegations that Libya was behind the hijacking.	25X <sup>-</sup> 25X <sup>-</sup> 25X <sup>-</sup>
many Lioyan operations.		25X

# Significant Abu Nidal Operations, 1985

25 September	Italy: Bomb exploded at British Airways office in Rome, injuring 15. Claimed by Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims (ROSM).
18 September	Greece: Palestinian magazine publisher, Michael al-Numari, assassinated in Athens. Claimed by Black September.
16 September	Italy: Grenades thrown at the Cafe de Paris in Rome, injuring 38 tourists, including 11 Americans. Claimed by ROSM.
3 September	Greece: Grenades thrown at Glyfada Hotel in Athens, wounding 19. Attack claimed by Black September and ROSM.
30 August	Greece: Palestinian arrested in Athens plotting the assassination of the Jordanian Ambassador. Claimed to be member of Black September.
8 August	Greece: Bomb exploded at London Hotel in Athens, wounding 13 British tourists. Claimed by ROSM.
24 July	Turkey: First Secretary at the Jordanian Embassy in Ankara assassinated by a lone gunman. Incident claimed by Black September, Islamic Jihad, and Hizballah.
21 July	Lebanon: Bomb exploded outside the Kuwaiti Airlines office in Beirut. Claimed by Arab Revolutionary Brigades.
11 July	Kuwait: Two powerful bombs exploded within minutes of each other, killing eight persons and injuring 89 at two crowded cafes about 10 kilometers apart. A third bomb was defused at another cafe. Arab Revolutionary Brigades claimed responsibility.
1 July	Spain: Bomb exploded at the British Airways ticket office in Madrid, also damaging the TWA office upstairs. The nearby ticket office of the Jordanian airline Alia was hit by automatic weapons fire and two grenades that failed to explode. One person was killed and 24 others wounded. Claimed by the Organization of the Oppressed, ROSM, and Black September.

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15 May	Lebanon: UN refugee official kidnaped, but released the next day. Claimed by ROSM.
23 April	Kuwait: Ahmad Jarallah, a moderate newspaper editor, was wounded as he was leaving his office. Arab Revolutionary Brigades claimed responsibility.
4 April	Greece: A rocket was fired at a Jordanian airliner taking off from Athens airport. The projectile hit the plane but did not explode. Claimed by Black September.
3 April	Italy: An antitank rocket was fired at the Jordanian Embassy in Rome. It missed the Embassy and hit an apartment on the fourth floor of the building, but caused no casualties. Claimed by Black September.
26 March	Lebanon: Alec Collett, a British journalist working for the UN refugee organization, was abducted from his automobile in Beirut. Claimed by ROSM.
21 March	Greece: An unidentified man threw a handgrenade into a Jordanian airline office in Athens, injuring three persons. Claimed by Black September.
	Cyprus: An unidentified man threw two handgrenades into a Jordanian airline office in Nicosia. Claimed by Black September.
9 March	United Arab Emirates: Bomb found on Jordanian airliner. The young Palestinian who carried the bomb onto the Karachi-to-Amman flight said he thought he was transporting drugs to support Abu Nidal terrorist operations.

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Belgium: Terrorist Attacks, October 1984 Through November 1985



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**Belgium: Terrorist** Violence Escalates


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Belgium is now afflicted with indigenous terrorism to much the same degree as its French and West German neighbors. The Communist Combatant Cells (CCC) and a few other, lesser known, terrorist groups have conducted some 30 attacks in Belgium in little more than a year. The CCC has concentrated its recent attacks against Belgian domestic interests, but US and NATO targets are also at risk. Moreover, CCC operations have become increasingly violent, and the group is employing new and more dangerous tactics. The inability of the Belgian security services to effectively counter the group portends a high level of terrorist activity.

## **Terrorism Emerges in Belgium**

Belgium had experienced little of the terrorism endemic to much of contemporary Western Europe until the fall of 1984. It appeared that terroristswhether of West European or Middle Eastern origin-viewed Belgium as a place of refuge, a safehaven to which revolutionaries could come, regroup, and rebuild their logistic bases. Terrorists had operated there only sporadically, and, in those few instances, against non-Belgian targets. But in late 1984 an indigenous Belgian terrorist group calling itself the Communist Combatant Cells carried out five attacks in the Brussels area between 2 and 17 October. The group—which seemed to be functioning as part of a loosely coordinated West European "antiimperialist front"—began its campaign by attacking defense-related targets-including the offices of the American firms Litton and Honeywell—but also bombed Belgian political targets.

From 26 November 1984 until 15 January 1985, the CCC concentrated on defense-related targets. It bombed a communications facility at the Bierset military airfield near Liege, claiming that the attack was in solidarity with a 1981 attack by the Red Army Faction (RAF) against Ramstein Air Force Base in West Germany. On 11 December, in its largest operation, the CCC planted six bombs that exploded in five different locations along NATO fuel pipelines and claimed that "war against NATO has become the principal aim of our movement." The pipeline had



CCC communique for attacks on Litton and Honeywell

been extensively described in RAF documents discovered in July 1984, and one of the facilities on the RAF target list was among those bombed in the CCC attack.

In what was to be the close of the group's "antiimperialist" campaign, the CCC set off a car bomb (20 kilograms of TNT) outside a NATO support building in Brussels on 15 January 1985. The blast

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wounded two military guards and caused extensive



CCC bombing of NATO pipelines

damage. The size of the bomb and its apparent intent to inflict casualties marked an escalation in CCC violence. The communique dedicated the attack to the Red Army Faction and said the CCC would target US military personnel in the future. Following this incident, however, the CCC called a halt to its operations, apparently to evaluate the impact of its actions and decide on its future course of action.

## The CCC Returns—and Kills

The CCC resumed its operations on 1 May when it placed a car bomb outside the Belgian Employers Federation in Brussels. The group also used new tactics in this operation; it set the vehicle on fire, scattered leaflets warning of an impending explosion, and phoned a bomb warning to the police. In spite of these efforts to avoid casualties, two firemen were killed by the blast—the first deaths resulting from a CCC operation.

The deaths of the firemen caused the CCC to take some unusual steps. The group immediately tried to shift responsibility to the police for not keeping the firemen away from the car bomb. It issued a communique expressing regret over the deaths, claiming that it had done everything possible to avoid fatalities and declaring that the CCC did not intend to kill or injure members of the Belgian working class. Then, on 6 May the group bombed a police administrative office, apparently to punish the police for the firemen's deaths. The 1 May incident may

have precipitated dissension and self-criticism within the CCC, because the group entered into another period of inactivity that was to last five months.

On 8 October—the anniversary of its attack on Honeywell—the CCC ended this hiatus by setting off a car bomb outside a Brussels gas company complex. It took elaborate precautions to avoid casualties by broadcasting a tape-recorded message from the vehicle, warning people to stay away from it. The group seemed determined to avoid repetition of the public outcry, which had ensued over the firemen's deaths. The communique that followed this attack announced the beginning of a "Karl Marx anticapitalist campaign," which implied a concentrated effort against business, industrial, and labor targets. But the CCC also struck other types of targets in rapid succession:

- On 12 October it expressed its intention to disrupt national parliamentary elections by setting off two bombs at a private metal company and at a government tax office in Charleroi. Leaflets found at the scenes were identical to those found outside the Brussels gas company on 8 October. The elections were held on 13 October without further however.
- On 19 October a small bomb exploded outside an armed forces information office.
- On 20 October a vehicle belonging to the president of the National Action Committee for Peace and Development—a pacifist organization opposed to the deployment of NATO cruise missiles in Belgium—was the target of an arson attack.

Although the last two attacks did not resemble previous CCC operations—and may be the work of a dissident faction within the CCC—copies of a communique ostensibly prepared by the group were found at both sites. This communique announced the opening of a "second front," to be called the "Pierre Akkerman' campaign," against bourgeois militarism

<sup>1</sup> Akkerman was a Belgian Communist killed in the Spanish civil war in 1936.

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# CCC Origins and Ideology and pachism. The community mass public demonstration deployment on 20 October ineffective petite bourgeois fragmentary and speculative. Its communiques, issued after several of its attacks, claim the group and pachism. The community mass public demonstration deployment on 20 October ineffective petite bourgeois

was organized in 1982, supports itself through bank robberies, plans its operations months in advance, and shares explosives with other West European terrorists. Following the 8 October 1984 attack against Honeywell, the CCC communique claimed the group was organized along the lines of the Italian

Red Brigades (BR).

the slogans, themes, and ideology were similar. The CCC's emblem, a five-pointed star, resembles that of the Italian group, and even the name "Communist Combatant Cells" was first used by Italian terrorists.

an extension of the French leftwing terrorist group

Action Directe (AD), or composed of individuals who had been members of support groups of the West German Red Army Faction (RAF).

French and West German terrorists maintain safehouses in Belgium, an RAF support network has previously existed in Belgium, and that there were known contacts between Belgian leftists—suspected of membership in the CCC—and French terrorists. The CCC's attacks against defense-related targets appeared to be part of the so-called Euroterrorist anti-NATO campaign started by Action Directe in Paris in the summer of 1984 and carried along by the RAF in the following months.

The CCC, however, has maintained that it is an indigenous and autonomous Belgian revolutionary group, not politically associated with or subordinate to Action Directe, the Red Army Faction, or any other foreign revolutionary movement.

the group is composed primarily of Belgian leftists who have decided to emulate their counterparts in terrorism along the lines of Italy, France, and West Germany.

and pacifism. The communique termed such acts as a mass public demonstration protesting missile deployment on 20 October as "the usual, useless, ineffective petite bourgeois sterile actions."

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If the CCC was responsible for the attack on the pacifist movement, it marks a further broadening of the group's roster of targets. Its attacks have been mounted against NATO and defense-related targets, domestic political parties, and "anticapitalist" symbols. Should the CCC now begin attacking the pacifist movement—which might have provided it with recruits and supporters—it is likely to isolate itself from those leftist segments of Belgian society it sought to attract.

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In early November the CCC demonstrated several more new tactics in four attacks against banks:

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• In one incident, the group placed a car bomb outside a Brussels bank. When a security vehicle happened on the scene, the terrorists sprayed it with automatic weapons fire, slightly wounding a guard. The terrorists, who had never before used firearms during an operation, demonstrated that they were both well armed—a subject of Belgian police speculation heretofore—and willing to resort to lethal force to avoid capture.

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• In two of the incidents, members of the group entered banks in Charleroi and Leuven during business hours, chained suitcase bombs to the premises and distributed leaflets warning of imminent explosions. The buildings were evacuated, and there were no injuries, but damage was extensive. The placing of bombs in occupied buildings suggests the CCC has become less concerned about causing casualties than it

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• In the last bank attack, the CCC also set off a suitcase bomb outside the Brussels branch of the US-owned Manufacturers Hanover Bank, causing major damage, but no injuries. This was its first attack against a US target in 10 months.

previously was, and that the group is growing

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bolder.

Taken together, the four attacks against banks form part of the group's Karl Marx anticapitalist campaign announced in October; the communique following these attacks said that the banks had been chosen as symbols of capitalism. Other Belgian, US, and foreign business interests may be targeted if this phase of CCC operations continues.

Othor Attacks

On 5 November 1984, the socalled Unknown Anarchist Group 2 placed a bomb under a police van in Brussels. The device malfunctioned, however, and was disarmed. Police initially suspected the CCC, but it was, unlike CCC attacks, a conspicuous failure, and it was not followed by one of the CCC's usual lengthy communiques. Then on the night of 20-21 April 1985—during a period of CCC inactivity—a group calling itself the "Revolutionary Front for Proletarian Action" (FRAP) claimed responsibility for attacks upon the North Atlantic Assembly building and the West German electronics firm AEG-Telefunken. In separate communiques, the group said it had attacked the North Atlantic Assembly because of its political connection with NATO and AEG-Telefunken because of its NATO military contracts. The FRAP claimed that it was created "to expand the revolutionary struggle against NATO," and declared itself to be a "revolutionary anti-imperialist organization acting against everything that directly or indirectly works at preparing for the imperialist war."

Little is known about either the "Unknown Anarchist Group" or the FRAP—which may be one and the same—but they do not appear to be covernames for the CCC. FRAP communiques tend to be anarchistic and less thematically coherent than those of the CCC, which takes a Marxist-Leninist line. In addition, CCC bombs have been professionally constructed of high explosives, more powerful and destructive than the other groups' devices. It may be significant, however, that the FRAP has used explosives stolen from the

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FRAP bombing of North Atlantic Assembly building

Ecaussines quarry in Belgium in June 1984—material that has also been used by Action Directe in France and the Red Army Faction in West Germany. We do not know for certain that the CCC has used explosives but the group has claimed to have

done so and has said that the quarry theft was carried out by an "international revolutionary commando."

## Outlook

Terrorist activities in Belgium probably will remain at a high level for the remainder of 1985 and into 1986, with the CCC continuing to pose the major threat. The group has undergone significant changes in its brief existence. Despite its early vow to wage an "anti-imperialist" campaign against NATO, it has not attacked a US military or NATO-related target since mid-January. Over the past 10 months, the CCC has focused on domestic rather than foreign targets and is likely to continue to do so. The group's activities may come to resemble those of Action Directe, which

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Responsibility for two previous bombings in Brussels in 1984—of the Palace of Justice on 19 May and the General Bank Association on 29 June—was claimed by the self-proclaimed "Unknown Group," and the "Still Unknown Group," respectively.

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primarily focuses on French domestic interests, but
occasionally attacks a foreign target. As security is
ightened around the more important symbolic
argets, that is, military installations, government
offices, and utilities, the CCC probably will turn to
more vulnerable targets.
Additional attacks by the CCC against US or NATO
argets are still possible. The group warned of its
ntention to kill US military personnel after the attack
on the NATO support facility, and it may yet carry
out its threat. As long as controversy continues over
leployment of NATO cruise missiles in Belgium, the
potential West European role in the Strategic Defense
nitiative program, and lack of success in arms control
negotiations, the CCC and other Belgian terrorists
nay find it politically expedient to attack symbolic
argets relating to these issues.

Belgium: Coping	With	Terrorism	
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Belgium, once relatively untouched by the terrorist phenomenon, now finds itself increasingly vulnerable because of its open borders, large number of attractive international targets, and the appearance of indigenous terrorist groups during the past year. A national counterterrorist body, championed by Minister of Justice Jean Gol, was established in September 1984, but a lack of training and experience, continuing interservice rivalries, and austere budgets will impede Belgium's counterterrorist efforts.

## Terrorism: Foreign and Domestic

Belgium historically has served as a supply base and sanctuary for terrorist groups from all corners of Europe. Foreign terrorists transit Belgium with ease. The border with France alone has 600 crossing points, only 40 of which are checked by police. The Spanish Basque separatist organization Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) created an infrastructure in Belgium in the 1960s and received open support from some extremist movements. More than 100 sympathizers attended the trial of four ETA members in 1983, and, according to ETA, the powerful bomb that extensively damaged the Palace of Justice in Antwerp was its retaliation for the extradition of two of the four to Spain.

As host to numerous exiles, particularly Albanians and Yugoslavs, as well as a growing Middle Eastern community, Belgium has been the venue of violent activity in the past. The Provisional Irish Republican Army carried out bombings in 1978 and 1979; the West German Red Army Faction attempted to blow up NATO Supreme Commander Haig's car in 1979; Palestinian guerrillas tried to seize an Israeli airplane at Brussels airport the same year; and an Armenian group claimed responsibility for the murder of a Turkish attache in 1983. Following an attack on a synagogue in 1982, Gol pushed for a central policymaking group—the Antiterrorist College—to collect intelligence and combat terrorism. Two years of study and negotiations on the complicated and politically sensitive organizational and control aspects of the College preceded the signing of protocols among the various police and security services.

Despite this progress, the Belgians were not fully prepared to deal with the series of bombings begun in October 1984 by the Communist Combatant Cells (CCC), a domestic group, which emerged during the heated debate on Intermediate Nuclear Force deployment. The CCC initially attacked NATO facilities and foreign subsidiaries of defense-related businesses initially, but the group recently has broadened its targets to include domestic companies, banks, and even the pacifist movement. Two other Belgian-based organizations, the Revolutionary Front for Proletarian Action (FRAP) and a radical environmental group, the Peace Conquerors, have also claimed credit for bombings. The nation's counterterrorist units have also had to deal with mindless criminal violence committed by a gangnicknamed the Crazy Brabant Killers—which has robbed supermarkets and killed bystanders indiscriminately, as many as seven at a time.

## Failures and Successes

Past performance by Belgian authorities has not been impressive, and such breakthroughs as have occurred have been fortuitous:

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- Pamphlets prepared by a Belgian printer, Pierre Carette, for the French terrorist group Action Directe (AD) in 1982 were discovered only after the car delivering them had an accident on the Brussels-Paris expressway.
- Operation Mammoth, a major counterterrorist effort launched with much fanfare in the fall of 1984, yielded few concrete results, despite more than 120 searches by hundreds of police officers.
- In March 1984 several AD leaders evaded arrest despite surveillance by the Judiciary Police for several days.

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Even successful antiterrorist operations often reveal police clumsiness. In a major success this summer, Belgian authorities discovered several apartments in the Brussels suburbs linked to the FRAP. Searches of the apartments yielded components for manufacturing bombs, money, weapons, false identification cards, and terrorist literature. During the several weeks in which police shadowed suspected FRAP member Chantal Paternostre, however, she and her husband copied down the license numbers of more than 30 undercover vehicles that followed them. Most of these belonged to the Groupe Diane, considered the country's elite counterterrorist unit. Following her arrest, she has not cooperated with police and is unlikely to do so because the judicial system makes no provision for plea bargaining.  Expanded Cooperation  Brussels has displayed some interest in exchanging information with other countries. West Germany and France, for example, drew Belgium into cooperative efforts in February when they agreed to form a joint operational working group to intensify police and intelligence exchanges. The Belgian Interforces  Antiterrorist Group (GIA), the German Federal Police (BKA), and the individual French services plan to establish a direct secure communication link for	• In June 1985 the Gendarmerie surprised a group digging up weapons near Leuven, but the detainees were later released because of a lack of evidence	25X1
police clumsiness. In a major success this summer, Belgian authorities discovered several apartments in the Brussels suburbs linked to the FRAP. Searches of the apartments yielded components for manufac- turing bombs, money, weapons, false identification cards, and terrorist literature. During the several weeks in which police shadowed suspected FRAP member Chantal Paternostre, however, she and her husband copied down the license numbers of more than 30 undercover vehicles that followed them. Most of these belonged to the Groupe Diane, considered the country's elite counterterrorist unit. Following her arrest, she has not cooperated with police and is unlikely to do so because the judicial system makes no provision for plea bargaining.  Expanded Cooperation  Brussels has displayed some interest in exchanging information with other countries. West Germany and France, for example, drew Belgium into cooperative efforts in February when they agreed to form a joint operational working group to intensify police and intelligence exchanges. The Belgian Interforces Antiterrorist Group (GIA), the German Federal Police (BKA), and the individual French services plan to establish a direct secure communication link for		25X1
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Faction, Action Directe, and the CCC.  25X1  25X1	Brussels has displayed some interest in exchanging information with other countries. West Germany and France, for example, drew Belgium into cooperative efforts in February when they agreed to form a joint operational working group to intensify police and intelligence exchanges. The Belgian Interforces Antiterrorist Group (GIA), the German Federal Police (BKA), and the individual French services plan to establish a direct secure communication link for exchanging information pertaining to the Red Army	25 <b>X</b> 1
Foreign Minister Tindemans also has stressed international cooperation. During Vice President Bush's visit in June, Tindemans pointed out that the Belgian Parliament had just approved a plan to work within the Council of Europe against terrorism. In his	international cooperation. During Vice President Bush's visit in June, Tindemans pointed out that the Belgian Parliament had just approved a plan to work	
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UN speech in September, Tindemans also urged countries to seek agreement on what acts constitute terrorism and to take some universally recognized measures to combat them.  Outlook Mixed  In a period of economic austerity, Brussels, until recently, devoted few resources to counterterrorist efforts. Between 1976 and 1983, the security budget did not increase as a share of GNP. Last fall, however, funds for security forces were augmented substantially, and money was earmarked to automate files of the State Security Service, establish a Senior Police Institute, and equip and train regional Gendarmerie special intervention units. These units are scheduled to be fully trained by late 1986 and will be responsive to tasking from both the GIA and the Gendarmerie. In addition, Brussels has authorized an increase in the strength of the Gendarmerie to nearly 17,000 by the end of 1986.  Rivalry among and within Belgium's various security services is rampant and obstructs the sharing of information. The services have been known to conduct investigations independently and to refuse to share evidence or leads. Different functional responsibilities between the Gendarmerie and the State Security Service also restrict cooperation. The Gendarmerie is primarily a paramilitary organization with law and	Despite the formation of the new Antiterrorist College and expanded counterterrorist cooperation, financial and personnel limitations and the inexperience of the newly formed GIA do not augur well for immediate results. For the time being, Belgium's response to terrorism is likely to be reactive rather than anticipatory, but public pressure should ensure continued focus on the problem.  25> 25>	X1 X1
order functions,	25>	<b>X</b> 1
The lack of a clearly defined chain of command will continue to create problems. Four different police forces answer to three different ministries. The Gendarmerie, for example, is tasked by the Ministry of Defense but also assists the Ministries of Interior and Justice. A study group is exploring the question of command structure, but this is likely to be a lengthy process.	25>	<b>X</b> 1
As bombings by the CCC and criminal violence continue unchecked, public anxiety is mounting. The government has announced measures to increase the coordination of police forces and to improve counterterrorist training. Justice Minister Gol is considering the formation of an as yet undefined "superpolice." The death penalty, which has not been		
applied since 1948, is again under discussion.		(1

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
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	The Terrorism Diary for January 1986
	Below is a compendium of January dates of known or conceivable significance to terrorists around the world. Our inclusion of a date or event should not by itself be construed to suggest that we expect or anticipate a commemorative terrorist event.
1 January 1804	Haiti. Independence Day.
1 January 1956	Sudan. Independence Day (proclamation of republic).
1 January 1959	Cuba. Liberation Day (day Batista government fell).
1 January 1960	Cameroon. Independence Day.
1 January 1962	Western Samoa. Independence Day.
1 January 1965	Palestinians. Palestinian revolution; founding of Fatah.
1 January 1984	Brunei. Independence Day.
2 January 1984	Tunisia. Start of countrywide bread riots over removal of subsidies for bread and pasta.
4 January 1984	Armenians. Conviction of US citizen of Armenian descent for assassinating Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles on 28 January 1982.
4 January 1948	Burma. Independence Day.
4 January 1974	Burma. Constitution of socialist republic adopted.
5 January 1956	Laos. Founding of Lao Patriotic Front.
6 January 1963	Colombia. Founding of National Liberation Army (ELN).
7 January 1979	Cambodia. Vietnamese invasion overthrows Khmer Rouge regime of Pol Pot.
8 January 1912	South Africa. Founding of African National Congress (ANC).
9 January 1964	Panama. Martyrs' Day (day of mourning commemorating anniversary of anti-US riots).
11 January 1946	Albania. Proclamation of republic.
11 January 1984	Yugoslavia. Suicide of two ethnic Albanian irridentists in Pristina, Kosovo, to avoid arrest.

12 January 1964	Tanzania. Zanzibar Revolution Day (people's republic established).
13 January 1967	Togo. Liberation Day (military coup).
13 January 1972	Ghana. National Redemption Day (anniversary of coup).
14 January 1986	Sri Lanka. Tamil New Year (old calendar).
15 January 1918	Egypt. Birthday of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir.
15 January 1922	Ireland. Founding of Irish Free State.
15 January 1985	West Germany, France. Red Army Faction and Action Directe issue joint communique declaring anti-imperialist front.
16 January 1977	Benin. Liberation Day; Martyrs' Day (repulsion of invasion by mercenary troops from Gabon).
16 January 1979	Iran. Shah Burning Day (departure of Shah from Iran).
17 January 1974	Colombia. Nineteenth of April Movement (M-19) steals sword of Simon Bolivar from Bogota Museum (group dates its founding from this act).
18 January 1974	Egypt, Israel. Disengagement Agreement signed.
20 January 1973	Guinea-Bissau. National Heroes Day (commemorating assassination of Amilcar Cabral, founder of ruling party—PAIGC).
20 January 1981	Iran. US Embassy hostages released.
22 January 1498	St. Vincent and The Grenadines. Discovery Day.
22 January 1918	Ukraine. Independence Day.
22 January 1945	Kurdish regions. Qazi Muhammed uprising.
22 January 1946	Iran. Kurdish Republic Day.
24 January 1859	Romania. Union Day.
26 January 1918	Romania. Birthday of President Ceausescu.
26 January 1950	India. Republic Day (national day).
26 January 1978	Tunisia. Black Thursday (anniversary of labor riots).
28 January 1788	Australia. Australia Day.

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28 January 1853	Cuba. Birthday of Jose Marti.
28 January 1948	India. Assassination of Mahatma Gandhi by Hindu extremist.
28 January 1961	Rwanda. Proclamation of the republic.
28 January 1982	Italy. Freeing of Red Brigades captive US Army Brigadier General Dozier.
30 January 1933	Germany. Accession to power by National Socialist (Nazi) Party.
30 January 1972	Northern Ireland. Bloody Monday (13 killed, 16 wounded during demonstration in Derry).
31 January 1968	Nauru. Independence Day.
31 January 1980	Guatemala. Occupation of Spanish Embassy by members of Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP); subordinate group, People's Front of 31 January (FP-31), takes its name from this event.

25X1

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### Chronology of Terrorism—1985

	Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving terrorists, or the use of terrorist tactics, which have occurred or come to light since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included.	25X1
7 October	Philippines: Police sergeant assassinated in Guagua by four unidentified individuals. No one has claimed credit for the murder, but his name reportedly appeared on a New People's Army "sparrow team" hit list seven weeks ago.	25X1
10 October	West Bank: Time bomb explodes in building housing Military Governor in Bayt Ayl. The Voice of Palestine claimed the attack by Palestinians wounded a number of Israelis and caused substantial damage.	25X1
11 October	Israel: Bombs explode in Tel Aviv coffeehouse, reportedly killing several persons and causing severe damage. The Voice of Palestine reported that the Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command mounted the attack, claiming Israeli intelligence operatives frequented the place.	25 <b>X</b> 1
12 October	Israel: Bomb explodes in yard of private house in Tel Aviv. There was no damage reported and no group claimed responsibility.	25 <b>X</b> 1
13 October	West Bank: Several settlers reportedly killed in explosion in Barbis Shak settlement. The Palestinian Revolutionary Forces General Command claimed responsibility in a PLO radiobroadcast.  Gaza Strip: Seventy-year-old man in Khan Yunus injured by unknown assailant wielding ax. The attack is the latest in a series of assaults believed to be terrorist related, probably carried out by Palestinians.	25X1 25X1
15 October	West Bank: Bus carrying Israeli settlers and soldiers firebombed near Hebron Gate in Jerusalem. A PLO radiobroadcast reported several Israelis were injured in the attack, and said the Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command was responsible.	25X1
Mid-October- Mid-November	Pakistan: Attacks against Afghan refugees in Peshawar increase. Two hotels, the office of the district refugee administrator, and a bazaar have been the targets of bombings. One bomb blast shut down the Peshawar television station.	25X1

19 October	Zimbabwe: Seven civilians killed in Nyaki Communal Lands. Security forces killed three of those believed responsible and recovered three AK-type rifles.	25X1
20 October	West Bank: Martyr Shakib Group of the Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command claims credit for explosion in Jerusalem. The attack reportedly resulted in a number of Israeli casualties.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Israel: One person injured in Tel Aviv blast. No group claimed responsibility for the explosion in the Shderot Yerushalayim area.	25X1
22 October	West Bank: Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command claims credit for incendiary attack on Israeli vehicle in Nabulus. The PLO radio reported that the vehicle was burned and the occupants injured.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Lesotho: Suspected members of Lesotho Liberation Army burn six women to death. The women were all political activists and one was related by marriage to the King. A seventh person, a neighbor of the women, was also killed. No one has claimed responsibility.	25X1
	Philippines: Gunmen kill 17 and burn houses on Mindanao. The attackers have not been identified, but the area is a stronghold of the Communist New People's Army.	25X1
23 October	Israel: Bomb explodes in 'Afula municipal market, injuring five persons. PLO radio claimed the Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command was responsible.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Late October	Turkey: Italian authorities capture leader of Dev Sol (Revolutionary Left), Pasha Guven. Guven is being tried in absentia, and Turkey has requested his extradition.	25X1
27 October	Sri Lanka: Explosion wounds five members of Tamil separatist Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Army in Jaffna. They were apparently assembling bombs to be used against government forces.	25X1
28 October	South Africa: Grenade attack on Cape Town gas station. A Soviet-made grenade failed to explode when unknown assailants tried to throw it through the window of the building.	25X1

29 October	South Africa: Kwazulu member of Parliament killed, son wounded while fleeing firebombed home. The victim was a political activist and former member of the outlawed African National Congress.	25X1
	India: Leading local member of Congress (1) Party assassinated in Punjab. Sikh militants have been blamed in what reportedly was the seventh killing of party officials since the middle of the month.	25X1
1 November	Mozambique: National Resistance Movement kidnaps three Portuguese farmers near Maputo. More than 20 Portuguese citizens seized by RENAMO rebels are still missing.	25 <b>X</b> 1
2 November	Sweden: Turkish-speaking man assassinates Kurdish resident in Stockholm. The victim was attending a Kurdish festival sponsored by the Kurdish Social Democratic Party. The Swedish press reported that the rival Kurdish Labor Party may have been responsible.	25X1
3 November	Israel: Bomb explodes near 'Afula high school. No casualties or damage were reported and no group claimed responsibility.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	South Africa: Township councillor resigns after home firebombed. He was the fourth member of the Guguletu Council to resign this year.	25X1
	Mozambique: Kidnaped priests found dead in Tete Province. Members of the National Resistance Movement had abducted the Portuguese and Mozambican clergymen on 25 October.	25X1
4 November	Israel: Bomb explodes in Haifa train station parking lot. There were no reported injuries or damage and no group claimed responsibility.	25 <b>X</b> 1
N.	West Bank: Time bombs reportedly kill unknown number of Israeli soldiers and settlers in separate attacks. The Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command "Martyr Isma'il Darwish Group" took credit for the attacks against what it said were an intelligence center in 'Afula and an observation post in Jerusalem.	25X1
	El Salvador: Guerrillas execute head of coffee-growing family in San Pedro Nonualco. The victim reportedly had received extortion letters from the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front but had refused to pay.	25X1
5 November	Italy: Bomb sent to Iranian Ambassador to Vatican. Police defused the device, which was hidden in an electronic calculator, arrived in a parcel marked "personal" from Paris. No one has claimed credit, but anti-Khomeini groups based	
	in Paris are suspected.	25X1

	Greece: Explosive device found in Athens building housing TWA offices. The homemade bomb was discovered in the stairway of the building.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	West Bank: Roadside bomb explodes north of Jerusalem. No injuries or damage	
	were reported and no organization claimed responsibility.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Israel: Timed explosions in Ashqelon and Haifa reportedly kill unknown number of Israelis. The Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command claimed the	4
	explosions also caused extensive damage and fires.	25X1
	Chile: Four bombs explode at Mormon churches in La Serena, Rancagua, and Santiago. No injuries were reported, and only the La Serena church reported extensive damage. With these four incidents, there have been 14 attacks this year	•
	on Mormon churches in Chile.	25 <b>X</b> 1
6 November	France: Airport police seize suitcase full of weapons en route to Iran. The unclaimed suitcase was discovered on embarkation when it went through an X-ray device. It reportedly contained three handgrenades, an incendiary grenade,	
	submachineguns, magazines, and ammunition.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	West Bank: Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command takes credit for bomb in settlement north of Jerusalem. A PLO radiobroadcast claimed that a time bomb caused a number of deaths and heavy damage	25X1
7 November	Israel: Small bomb explodes near central bus station in Kefar Sava. In a PLO radiobroadcast the Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command claimed responsibility.	25 <b>X</b> 1
·	Mozambique: Three civilians kidnaped from maternity clinic near Maputo by National Resistance Movement. Besides taking a midwife, an orderly, and a four-year-old girl, the guerrillas also took medicines, hospital uniforms, and powdered	20/(1
	milk.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Sri Lanka: Tamil militants kill 12 Sinhalese, burn homes in Trincomalee District. Ten children were reportedly among the dead. Security forces later killed	
	33 suspects in a sweep operation.	25X1
8 November	West Germany: Press receives letter from previously unknown group claiming  NATO pipeline bombings at Baal and Phillipsheim. A search located a defective	•
	device at Baal, but no device was found in the second location. Police have stated that the incidents were conducted by members of the militant periphery of the Red Army Faction.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Mozambique: Portuguese hostage held by National Resistance Movement dies. He and his wife had lived in Zambezia Province for 30 years until they were kidnaped last July.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Ridilapou last July.	∠5∧1

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9 November	France: Car bomb explodes outside palace of the Archbishop of Paris. There were no casualties and no group has claimed responsibility.	25X1
	Luxembourg: Two bombs destroy radar equipment at Findel Airport, slightly injuring one man. The explosion also caused more than \$1 million in damage. This was the 12th bombing in Luxembourg since April.	25X1
	Israel: Explosion in cotton storage area near Nazareth reportedly kills several Israelis. In a PLO broadcast, the Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command claimed credit.	25X1
	Peru: Tupac Amaru (MRTA) terrorists throw bombs and fire machineguns at US Embassy in Lima. MRTA members in two automobiles carried out the attack, which damaged the Embassy's walls and windows, but caused no casualties. The MRTA claimed the attack was intended "to reject US imperialist policy."	25X1
	Peru: Tupac Amaru (MRTA) terrorists throw dynamite at Texaco office in Lima.  There were no casualties and only minor damage.	25X1
	South Africa: Firebomb extensively damages Mbekwani railroad station and ticket office. There were no casualties reported and no group has claimed credit.	25X1
	India: Two civilians killed by suspected Sikh militants in Punjab. This was reportedly the third such shooting in the state within a week.	25X1
	India: Postmaster and four postal workers killed by parcel bomb in Gujarat. No group has claimed responsibility.	25 <b>X</b> 1
10 November	West Bank: Resident of Nahalin killed in apartment explosion. Military sources believe the man may have been preparing a bomb.	25X1
	West Bank: Resident of Bet Haggay settlement near Hebron wounded by gunfire.  The Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command claimed responsibility for the attack—the third involving a resident of Bet Haggay in recent months.	25X1
	Peru: Sendero Luminoso uses "burro bomb" in city of Huanta. The explosion scattered propaganda leaflets urging citizens not to vote in 24 November municipal elections. Except for the hapless burro, there were no casualties.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Sri Lanka: Six civilians killed by Tamil separatists in attack on village of Uksirigama. A similar attack had taken place two days earlier, but there was no report of casualties in that incident.	25X1

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11 November	West Germany: Bomb damages office of Aeronautics and Aerospace Technology Institute in West Berlin. Although no group claimed credit, the institute is listed in the February 1985 edition of the "Antimilitaristic Tour Guidebook" published by the West Berlin Independent Plenum, which includes suspected members of the	
	RAF periphery.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	West Bank: Bomb dismantled near Ari'el settlement gas station. No group claimed responsibility	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Chile: Gunmen in Santiago open fire on two policemen, killing one and seriously wounding the other. There was no claim of responsibility for the attack.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Colombia: Two bombs in Medellin damage clothing warehouse, radio-television repair shop. Property damage was estimated at 4 million pesos, approximately US \$26,640. The "Che Guevara Commando" group, thought to be part of the	
	National Liberation Army, has been blamed for the attacks.	25 <b>X</b> 1
12 November		25 <b>X</b> 6
	West Germany: Explosion damages armed forces office in Neustadt. No injuries were reported and no group has claimed responsibility.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Spain: Bombs damage offices of Honeywell-Bull computer company in San Sebastian and an Avis rental truck in Bilbao. The Basque terrorist group Iraultza claimed responsibility for the bombing in San Sebastian, but there has been no claim for the other incident.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Israel: Two Jerusalem youths sentenced to prison for Fatah membership. The military court judge noted the two admitted membership but had not participated in any terrorist attacks when he handed down 15-month terms for each youth.	25 <b>X</b> 1
14 November		25 <b>X</b> 6
14 Ivovember		20/10
	West Germany: Moscow-Paris express train strikes barricade constructed on outbound tracks in West Berlin. Leaflets found at the scene linked the incident to the recent death in Amsterdam of a Dutch leftwing activist who had been detained	,
	by police.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Colombia: Fourteen self-proclaimed 19th of April Movement members fail in attempt to rob candy factory in Barranquilla. Unable to open the company safe, they threw a bomb and a grenade into the warehouse, and set fire to large sacks of	
	sugar.	25 <b>X</b> 1

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	Peru: Tupac Amaru (MRTA) terrorists attack Colombian Embassy and Colombian airline office in Lima. A Colombian Embassy guard killed in the attack was the first death resulting from an MRTA operation. There were no injuries in the airline office attack, but minor damage was reported. This was the first time the MRTA has attacked a target that was not Peruvian or American	25 <b>X</b> 1
15 November	Colombia: Founder of National Liberation Army (ELN) shot to death near his home in Barrancabermeja. The former ELN guerrilla leader had previously received several death threats.	25X1
Mid-November		25 <b>X</b> 6
16 November	Botswana: Car bomb in parking lot of Debora Relief Memorial Hospital kills four persons, wounds several others. No one has claimed responsibility for the blast	25 <b>X</b> 1
17 November	Car explodes in Paris underground parking garage, killing two persons. Police believe the men were extreme rightwing activists.  Lebanon: Shia Muslim group claims March kidnaping of four Lebanese Jews in Beirut. A typewritten statement signed by the "Organization of the Oppressed" said the four, among them the vice president of the Higher Council of the Jewish Community in Lebanon, would be freed if Israel and its militia allies in South Lebanon freed all their prisoners.	25X1 25X1
18 November	Lehanan: Sanjar Christian alaria assassinated in Frat Bring The Land	25 <b>X</b> 6
	Lebanon: Senior Christian cleric assassinated in East Beirut. The deputy bishop of the Maronite Christian community in Zahle and his nephew were shot by unidentified gunmen. The murders came two months after Syrian troops moved into Zahle pledging to protect Christians against sectarian attacks.  Iran: Three terrorists executed for bombing at Tehran University. The blast, at a prayer meeting last winter, reportedly killed five persons and wounded 10 others. One of the executed terrorists was said to have received sabotage training in Iraq.	25 <b>X</b> 1
		25 <b>X</b> 1

	RPG-2 rocket. The airport and a parked aircraft sustained minor damage. There was no claim of responsibility, but the Movement of the Revolutionary Left reportedly received RPG-2 weapons from Cuba in 1984 and 1985, and police confiscated two RPG-2 rockets earlier this year that probably belonged to that	
	group.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Peru: Sendero Luminoso bombs Ayacucho city hall, seriously injuring two	į.
	employees. The explosion damaged some offices in the municipal building.	25X1
		•
20 November	France: Four suspected members of Spanish Antiterrorist Liberation Group	
	arrested in Marseilles. Police believed they were involved in an attempted car	
	bombing in France's Basque country last September.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Lebanon: Representatives of International Red Cross kidnaped, released near Tyre. Four unidentified gunmen seized two Swiss citizens, but released them	
	unharmed seven hours later. No group has claimed responsibility.	25X1

Chile: Tobalaba Airport in eastern Santiago attacked with handgrenades and an

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